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The Burlington Races Revisited 
A Revised Analysis of an 1813 Naval 
Battle for Supremacy on Lake Ontario 
Robert J. Williamson 
'Q:om the safety of the Lake Ontario shore near 
ll Burlington. military and civilian observers 
witnessed the jockeying for position of many 
sailing vessels during the afternoon of Tuesday. 
September 28, 1813. They likened the event to a 
yacht race. Thus, a pivotal naval engagement that 
would determine the outcome of the War of 1812 
was facetiously labelled, "The Burlington Races." 
The facts of this important piece of Canadiana. 
have, like so many significant historical events. 
been cloaked by myth and misconception until 
recently. The discovery in the US National 
Archives of the log of the British flagship of the 
Lake Ontario Squadron, HMS Wolfe, has made 
it possible to interpret this episode in Canadian 
history more accurately. 
The Wolfe's log came to light by accident 
during research for the Hamilton and Scourge 
project in 19 71. How the log book of the Wolfe 
found its way to Washington was, until recently, 
a bit of a mystery. On 7 September 1999, the 
National Archives in Washington verified that the 
log was received in Washington on 2 December 
1814 from Captain Tho. Macdonough of 
Plattsburgh, New York. Therein lies the link with 
Captain George Downie who, in June 1814, was 
appointed to command HMS Wolfe or Montreal 
as she had just recently been renamed. The name 
change would have made the log of the Wolfe, 
dated 8 June- 20 December 1813, redundant. 
As an archival record, it would have been the 
captain's responsibility to safeguard the log until 
it could have been forwarded to the British 
Admiralty. At the end of August, Downie was 
hurriedly ordered to the Isle-aux-Noix shipyard 
on Lake Champlain to command the newly-
launched frigate HMS Conjiance. On 11 
September 1814. Downie was killed in action and 
his squadron surrendered to Captain 
Macdonough at the Battle of Plattsburgh. It is 
almost certain that Macdonough found the log of 
the Wolfe, awaiting delivery to the Admiralty, in 
Downie's personal effects. Before being sent to 
Washington, the log was viewed and signed by 
Commodore Issac Chauncey, the senior officer 
ofthe US Navy on the Great Lakes. 
The Burlington Races occurred just 18 days 
after Commodore Perry's stunning victory on 
Lake Erie. Many historians, however, have failed 
to realize that Perry's success was meaningless 
without the necessary sequel on Lake Ontario, 
the key to the Great Lakes. Commodore 
Chauncey, having been overshadowed by his 
subordinate's victory, was under pressure to 
administer the "coup de grace." The British lion 
on Lake Ontario had to be caged in order to bring 
about an end to hostilities in Upper Canada, the 
principal theatre of the war. This would allow 
Major-General Wilkinson to safely tranship his 
American army on the Niagara Peninsula to the 
St. Lawrence River where, according to the United 
States government's revised strategy for the war, 
he would co-ordinate with Major-General 
Hampton from Plattsburgh, New York, in a two-
pronged attack on Montreal. A stranglehold on 
this choke point, the heart of the Canadian 
colonies, would end the war. On the other hand, 
an unchecked Royal Navy under the command 
of the feted Commodore Sir James Yeo, roaming 
freely on Lake Ontario, could spell disaster to 
this new American offensive. Therefore, the event 
that was to be called the Burlington Races would 
prove to be a crucial naval engagement and 
indeed, a turning point in the war. 
On paper, the American squadron had the 
advantage in numbers, ten vessels to six; and in 
firepower, a broadside weight-of-metal ratio of 
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Commodore Isaac Chauncey 
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three to two. They outgunned the British in long 
range cannon by three to one. The only statistic 
that favoured the Royal Navy was a 20 percent 
surfeit in short range smashers or carronade. 
These statistics are based on a report made by 
Commodore Yeo to Admiral Warren on 29 
September 1813. 1 In reality, the combatants were 
more equal than the figures imply. Six ships of 
the American squadron were converted merchant 
schooners, not fighting ships. They were more 
useful as gunboats for bombardment than naval 
battles. Top heavy and unwieldy in bad weather, 
their sailing characteristics were so divergent that 
Chauncey had great difficulty in keeping his ships 
in formation; so much so that in this action, three 
of the schooners were tied to mother ships in a 
towing formation. While these vessels added to 
the weight of Chauncey's firepower, they seriously 
hampered his speed and manoeuvrability. On the 
other hand, the British ships were faster, held 
their formation well and could better concentrate 
their effort. 
When the two squadrons met off the port of 
York (Toronto) on this fateful day, the weather, 
described in the log of the Wolfe, was "cloudy 
with fresh breezes of E.N.E. wind."2 According 
to the navy's Beaufort Wind Scale which 
measures wind force from 0-10, fresh breezes 
8 
Commodore Sir James Yeo 
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are force 5 with wind speed between 17 and 21 
knots.:; The gale force winds of legend appear to 
have been only in Chauncey's mind as he 
searched for excuses to explain his later actions. 
Yeo, havingjust arrived at York that morning, sent 
a boat ashore with dispatches. At 10:00 am the 
enemy squadron bore down on the anchorage. 
By 10:30, Yeo had recovered his dispatch boat 
and weighed anchor. He headed out into the lake 
to gain "sea room" on a port tack. Since the wind 
was from the ENE, this would have placed him 
on a SSE course towards the Niagara River. At 
12:30 pm, he manoeuvred to bring the American 
squadron within range of his carronades while 
at the same time causing the sluggish American 
formation to become very extended. 
Consequently, as the two squadrons engaged, it 
was the two flagships, HMS Wolfe and USS Pike, 
that took the brunt of the action. It should also 
be noted that Yeo had manoeuvred the Americans 
into a position where their gunnery solutions were 
complicated. They had to engage the enemy with 
their port side guns while heeled over to port on 
a starboard tack. Nevertheless, by l :20 pm. the 
Wolfe's main and mizzen topmasts were shot 
away while the Pike had been dangerously holed 
below the water line and had serious damage on 
her forward gun deck when one of her own 
cannons exploded, killing or wounding a large 
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number of her crew. The damage to the Wo~fe's 
sails meant a critical loss of manoeuvrability, but 
the disciplined British formation, led by HMS 
Royal George, intervened and helped extricate 
their flagship from the close action. In Yeo's report 
of the battle, he wrote, "[When] the main and 
mizzen topmasts of this ship were shot away, by 
which she became unmanageable on the wind, I 
put the squadron before the wind for a small bay 
at the head of the lake where he [Chauncey] would 
have been under the necessity of engaging on 
more equal terms. this however he declined ... and 
on approaching the bay, he hauled off, leaving us 
in this state perfectly unmolested to refit the 
squadron." 4 
Yeo's phrase, "engaging on more equal terms" 
has never yet been satisfactorily explained by 
historians. It certainly does not imply that he 
intended to run away and hide behind a sandbar 
at the head of the lake, an impression held by 
many people until Robert Malcomson published 
his recent book, Lords of the Lake. Military logic 
dictates that because of battle damage to the 
Wolfe's sails, Yeo could not engage in battle 
manoeuvres and would have to attempt to make 
a stand from an anchored position on a friendly 
shore. An examination ofthe ship's log confirms 
this. It states, "At 4.30 arrived with the squadron 
and came to an anchor off Burlington Bay, close 
in shore with springs on the cables." 5 By 
anchoring his ships on their back springs (a 
heavy hawser pulled the anchor to the ship's 
stern) the ships could be swung in the wind by 
releasing the spring hawser, thus presenting a 
fresh bank of guns to the enemy when necessary. 
Yeo would have doubled his firepower by this 
procedure and negated his loss of 
manoeuvrability by establishing a strong and 
compact defensive unit at anchor. This was a 
standard tactic of the period, used by the 
American squadron successfully against the 
British at Plattsburgh in 1814 on Lake 
Champlain. Fifteen years earlier in 1798, the 
Ninety minutes after tile engagement began tile British line, led by HMS Royal George. intervened to llelp 
extricate their damaged .f1agsl1ip from tile close action witll USS Pike. This painting "Engagement in tile 
Gale" is by Canadian marine artist Peter Rindlisbacller and tile original is lleld by tile Davies Charitable 
Foundation. 
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The Burlington Numbered Log Entries of HMS Wolfe From 0 10:40 -formed battle order, cleared for action 
Races York 
f) Noon - enemy on weather quarter, 1 Y, miles 
6) 12:30 -tacked with squadron in succession, 
0 commenced action 0 1 :20 - Wolfe's main and topmast shot away, 28 September 1813 bore up and stood before the wind 
0 2:00 -[Royal George intercedes], wreckage 
HMS Royal George It cleared, stood towards Head of Lake 
HMS Wolfe W 
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French fleet attempted this same strategy at 
Aboukir Bay in Egypt against the formidable 
Admiral Nelson. However, through daring and 
superb seamanship, Nelson was able to envelop 
the French line and destroy their immobile ships 
one by one. But Commodore Chauncey was no 
Nelson. Having put the British to flight, he was 
satisfied to claim a partial victory. He declined 
to take any further risk by being drawn into a 
situation where he would have to engage the 
enemy on more equal terms. It was a decision 
that would haunt his reputation ever after. 
By forming a battle line close into the shore 
in a constricted area at the head of the lake, Yeo's 
back was protected and the American ships, most 
of them rather unwieldy, especially those towing 
schooners, would have found manoeuvring in 
such close environs very difficult and dangerous. 
Chauncey made note of this in his report; "I 
considered that if I chased the enemy to his 
anchorage, we should [all] go on shore; he 
amongst his friends, we amongst our enemies .. .! 
[therefore] relinquished the opportunity of 
acquiring individual reputation, at the expense 
of my country."6 In other words, he rightly 
perceived the danger. Furthermore, in Chauncey's 
Report to the Secretary of the Navy, he stated, 
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making so much water that it required all our 
pumps to keep her free, owing to our receiving 
several shots so far below the water's edge that 
we could not plug the holes from the outside." 7 
Many historians, having accepted the American 
claim to victory, have conveniently overlooked the 
fact that the Pike was perhaps more badly 
damaged than the Wolfe, and probably in danger 
of sinking. Furthermore, the weather was 
deteriorating and it was not the American policy 
to fight under such conditions which negated the 
accuracy of their long range guns. Chauncey 
turned away in order to get back to port in the 
Niagara River as quickly as possible. From there 
he was able to make repairs and keep the British, 
who were anchored on the lake. under his 
observation. If he was unable to defeat the British 
squadron, then his primary objective was to keep 
them away from the American convoys sailing 
from Niagara carrying the American army to the 
St. Lawrence River for the pending attack on 
Montreal.~ No one, of course, had any inkling of 
what misfortune lay ahead for the Americans at 
Chrysler's farm and Chateauguay. 
It is a Canadian myth that the British 
squadron made a daring escape from Chauncey 
by sailing through the four-foot shallows of the 
Burlington Bay mouth sandbar at the head of 
4
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This dramatic painting. e11tilled "Burlington Races" by Peter Rindlisbacller, portrays the damaged Wolfe 
approaching the sandbar at the head of Lake Ontario, perpetuating the myth that the British squadron 
crossed into Burlington Bay to escape their encounter with tile Americans. This painting was commissioned 
by the Hamill.on - Scourge Foundation. 
the lake. This embellished account, full of 
swashbuckler "derring-do," first appeared in a 
magazine serial for the Canadian Collier's 
Weekly in 1913. It was to be part of the 
celebrations for the centennial of the War of 1812. 
Local historians in the Hamilton- Burlington area 
embraced the exciting story with pride, even 
though the author warned in his introduction, 
that imagination had been used to "clothe the 
dry bones of record with the flesh and blood of 
fancy." 9 That fancy has become fact Many writers 
since that time. including myself. have 
perpetuated this account. A provincial historical 
plaque on Burlington Heights now gives credence 
to this myth. The Hamilton-Scourge Foundation 
has further popularized the incident with their 
beautiful prints of renowned Canadian artist 
Peter Rindlisbacher's outstanding and dramatic 
depiction of the Wolfe running close inshore at 
Burlington Beach. 
Yeo did not have to hide his squadron behind 
the safety of a sandbar to escape an enemy who 
had long since turned away, or to seek shelter 
from a non-existent gale. Tucked into the 
Burlington shore on Lake Ontario, he was 
perfectly safe, for he knew the capabilities of his 
enemy. Considering that Yeo arrived in Canada 
after a court martial for grounding his last 
command, it is highly unlikely that he would have 
risked his entire squadron in the shallow channel 
entrance to what is now Hamilton Harbour, 
especially when it was unnecessary. But, legends 
die hard. 10 
The only way of setting the record straight is 
to let the eye witnesses whose words were 
11 
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Although the log of HMS Wolfe does not record the speed or distance travelled, it does give time, direction 
and juxtaposition of ships. Estimating an average speed of 10 mph, the above plan view presents a 
reasonable depiction of what happened on 28 September 1913. Note that by anchoring at 4:30pm. the 
British Squadron could not have reached, according to legend, the confines of what is now known as 
Burlington Bay or Hamilton Harbour. 
recorded, tell us what happened. They are the 
watchkeeping officers of the Wolfe who made the 
entries in the ship's Remarks Log. Although their 
individual script, with unique characters and long 
flourishing down or cross strokes, requires 
careful study, their record is legible. The log does 
not record speed or distance travelled, but it does 
give date, time, weather, direction of movement 
and position of ships. To depict the action of 28 
September 1813 on a map to scale, an estimated 
speed of the Wolfe is required. To establish this, 
the writings of Patrick O'Brian, regarded by many 
as the greatest navy historical authority of the 
Napoleonic period, have been consulted. Eleven 
knots or 12.7 mph appears to be the top speed 
for a war ship under perfect conditions. 11 
However, most marine engineers agree that 7 
knots is a more reasonable speed, considering 
the manoeuvering of the squadron and the Wolfe's 
battle damage. The average speed of advance 
would therefore have been about 8.05 mph or 
13 kph. The distance from York to the head of 
the lake, over water, is 50 kilometres. It would 
have taken the Wolfe at least four hours to reach 
the bay at the head of the lake. However, she 
12 
anchored at 4:30 pm, just three hours after 
putting before the wind off York. The British 
Admiralty charts of 1815 show an anchorage off 
Bronte. Time and distance calculations indicate 
that this anchorage is the logical position reached 
by the British squadron. If these calculations are 
correct, then the British could not have reached 
the confines of Burlington Bay as the legend 
states. 
There is, however, even more compelling 
evidence in the log. The squadron came to anchor 
off Burlington Bay, not in it. Each day from 
Tuesday, September 28 to Monday, October 4, 
while at anchor, the log of the Wolfe records that 
the enemy was in sight off Niagara. This 
observation would only have been possible if the 
British anchorage was in Lake Ontario off Bronte. 
On 29 September, HMS Melville and HMS 
Beresford weighed anchor and were sent to scout 
out the enemy. On 2 October, at 6:00am the sick 
and wounded were sent to hospital in York on 
board the sloop Mary Ann. At 8:00am the entire 
squadron weighed anchor and made sail towards 
4 Mile Creek Uust east of the Niagara River). Late 
6
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that afternoon near 12 Mile 
Creek (St. Catharines), a 
boat came off shore with 
Colonel Harvey to 
communicate with the 
Commodore. The next 
morning, Sunday, October 3, 
the squadron returned to 
their anchorage at the head 
of the lake. 12 During all these 
activities the log does not 
make any reference to 
crossing or re-crossing the 
sand bar into Burlington Bay. 
Such freedom of movement 
could only have been 
possible if the squadron was 
anchored on the lake. 
A provincial plaque on Burlington Heights erroneously gives credence 
The legend also claims to the myth that during the battle, the British squadron ran away 
that the Canadian pilot of the and hid in Burlington Bay. 
Wolfe, James Richardson Jr., was awarded a greatest damage was done to his reputation. 
pension for his part in guiding the ship over the During this engagement when he appeared to 
sandbar. Richardson wrote his memoirs after the have attained the upper hand, he proved wary 
war. While there is extensive coverage of his life and excessively cautious, not making the best use 
on Lake Ontario, and in particular, the Battle of of his force. In 1814 he became even less effective. 
Oswego where he lost his arm, there is no Throughout the war, he failed, except for brief 
mention of any heroic passage over the sandbar periods, to establish a naval superiority on Lake 
into Burlington Bay. His pension was most likely Ontario. At last, the confidence of President 
awarded for the loss of his arm at Oswego, not Madison was shaken, and he ordered 
his supposed navigational expertise.I3 Commodore Decatur to relieve him. 15 But the 
damage was done. Without naval superiority on 
Lake Ontario, the Americans had no chance of 
winning the War of 1812. 
The Wolfe's Remarks Log and Richardson's 
memoirs are the only contemporary records of 
what happened that day. If the squadron had 
crossed the sandbar and entered Burlington Bay, 
these most relevant sources would have recorded 
the fact. They do not. Therefore, the story is a 
myth, a tale dressed up to make an interesting 
magazine series, almost one hundred years ago. 
In reality, the British and Americans eyed 
each other suspiciously from their respective 
anchorages across the lake and licked their 
wounds. Their commanders evaluated their 
situation and made out their reports. Chauncey 
stated that he had 27 men killed and wounded 
including 22 by the bursting of a gun. 14 The log 
of the Wo{fe reports, "two men viz. John 
Edwards, seaman and Charles Kinslea M. Arms, 
killed and two seamen, Robert Archibald and 
John Baker wounded." If casualty reports mean 
anything to the outcome of a battle, then 
Chauncey clearly had suffered the most. But the 
In the aftermath of this event, both sides 
attempted to preserve a measure of pride 
commensurate with the battle's historic 
importance. Incredibly, both American and 
Canadian historians have generally accepted that 
it was an American victory because the British 
"ran away." However, on closer examination, we 
can interpret that the British squadron only 
retreated to where it could assume a strong 
defensive position by anchoring with springs on 
their cables, close inshore at the head of the lake. 
This was a standard practice employed by all 
navies of that period. With the American 
squadron heading for home, it was unnecessary 
for the British to salvage victory from defeat by 
brazenly crossing the sandbar and hiding in 
Burlington Bay (Hamilton Harbour). That is pure 
myth. It was, in fact, the Americans who turned 
away, their flagship in jeopardy of sinking, their 
13 
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HMS Wolfe leads the British Squadron out Q[ Toronto Harbour; September 28, 1813 by Peter Rindlisbacher. 
ungainly mixture of ships wary of manoeuvring 
on a lee shore in deteriorating weather conditions 
and their commander unwilling to face the British 
on "more equal terms." Under these 
circumstances, one can hardly describe this event 
as a British defeat. 
However, strategically, the Americans 
accomplished their goaL While the refitting 
squadrons surveyed each other from across the 
lake, General Wilkinson moved his army from 
the Niagara Peninsula to the St. Lawrence River, 
unmolested. In the end, however, this strategy 
accomplished nothing. It was, in fact, a disaster 
for the Americans. Both armies came to ruin in 
the St. Lawrence Valley: General Wilkinson's 
army at Chrysler's farm and General Hampton, 
at Chateauguay. The assault on Montreal fizzled 
out. The British army, meanwhile, occupied the 
weakened Niagara frontier and captured Fort 
Niagara, thereby making the Niagara River a 
British supply port for their troops on the Niagara 
Peninsula. Yeo's Lake Ontario naval squadron 
survived the scrape of 28 September as strong 
as ever. In fact, it went on the offensive in the 
following Spring and helped to capture Fort 
Oswego along with enough naval stores to 
significantly delay Chauncey's ship building 
program at Sackets Harbour. This had serious 
consequences for the American offensive in the 
summer of 1814. 
14 
With the aid of information provided by the 
log of HMS Wolfe it is now clear that the naval 
engagement known as the Burlington Races, was 
conducted by the British with characteristic 
professionalism, in keeping with the high 
standards of the Royal Navy during the Nelson 
period. By maintaining the integrity of his 
squadron, Yeo played a far more important role 
in the events of the War of 1812 that shaped our 
future, than generations of historians have been 
prepared to grant him. If the British naval 
squadron on Lake Ontario had not thwarted 
Chauncey's attempt to attain complete control 
of the Great Lakes on 28 September 1813, it is 
safe to say that Sou them Ontario would probably 
be a state of the American Union today. If in doubt 
about Yeo's accomplishment, then refer to the 
words of the greatest military authority of that 
period, the Duke of Wellington, who is reported 
to have said, "Any offensive operation founded 
upon Canada must be preceded by naval 
superiority on the Lakes." 
Postscript 
I\ 11 too many historians of the War of 1812 have 
r-lfailed to show the relationship between land 
battles and the less glamorous but vital, naval 
control of supply routes. Consequently, events 
such as the "Burlington Races" are dismissed as 
8
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insignificant engagements in comparison to the 
Battle of Lake Erie, which has for almost two 
centuries, overshadowed it. However, on further 
analysis, the fallout of the "Burlington Races" had 
a far greater impact on the outcome of the war 
than Perry's victory on Lake Erie. 
For example, after 10 September 1813, with 
Lake Erie under American control, the British 
on the Detroit frontier were completely exposed 
on their southern flank and withdrew up the 
Thames Valley towards Burlington Heights. The 
American army under General Harrison followed. 
On 3 October 1813, the British were defeated at 
the Battle of the Thames and nothing stood 
between Harrison and Lake Ontario. It was one 
of the darkest days in the War of 1812 for the 
British. Things were so bad that Governor 
General Prevost ordered General Vincent at 
Burlington Heights to abandon Upper Canada 
and retreat to Montreal. Fortunately, General 
Vincent was made of sterner stuff, and like Nelson 
with his blind eye at the Battle of Copenhagen. 
chose to ignored his superior. After all, the British 
Lake Ontario Squadron had not been defeated 
on 28 September and was presently anchored 
on his doorstep at the head of the lake. He 
correctly assessed that Harrison was not a threat 
as long as the Americans had not achieved naval 
control of Lake Ontario. With Wilkinson's army 
heading eastward down the St. Lawrence River, 
Harrison was quite isolated and had no choice 
but to return to his supply base at Detroit. Thus 
ended the invasion of Upper Canada from the 
west. 
The invasion of Upper Canada from Buffalo 
in 1814 also failed because Yeo had been able to 
fend off the American attempt to take naval 
control of Lake Ontario. By maintaining the 
integrity of his squadron, Yeo was eventually able 
to go on the offensive and in the spring and 
summer of 1814 attained naval control of Lake 
Ontario by default. Thus the British were at 
liberty to resupply and re-enforce their army on 
the Niagara Peninsula and thereby played an 
important but unsung part in the defeat of the 
American invasion of Canada at the Battle of 
Lundy's Lane. From the port of York on the 
evening of 24 July 1814, HMS Star and HMS 
Charwell embarked General Drummond, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Morrison, the hero of 
Chrysler's Farm, and 400 men of the tough 89th 
Regiment. With a fair breeze, the ships arrived 
in the mouth of the Niagara River at daybreak. 
Augmented by the troops from the local garrison 
at Fort George, the 89th Regiment, under the 
command of General Drummond, marched up 
the river road to play their part in Canada's 
destiny along an insignificant farmer's lane within 
earshot of Niagara Falls. Once again it can be 
seen how the outcome of the War of 1812 can be 
traced to that pivotal naval engagement known 
as the Burlington Races. 
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